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Introduction 
Can we predict the failure of peace after a crisis has been settled? Some crises might 
break out again after years of peace, yet others are fully resolved and, hence, do not recur. 
The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset indicates that almost half of all 
international crises since 1918 were recurring ones, i.e., crises that are related to some 
earlier hostility between the same actors on the same issue (Hewitt 2003).1 A recurring 
crisis is a failure to maintain peace between actors. At the same time, a non-recurring 
crisis and the durability of the settlement following the first crisis is regarded a “success.” 
But what specific factors affect the risk of non-recurrence of an international crisis? 
International organizations (IOs) usually have an intermediary role between states, and 
this shapes the motivation of this article: do IOs prevent international crises from 
recurring between the same actors? I examine states’ count of co-memberships in IOs 
with a view to identifying the passive mechanisms that create peace and induce the non-
recurrence of an international crisis. To this end, this research is not about examining the 
active involvement of an IO in an interstate crisis, but what the passive impact of an IO 
derived from membership in that organization is on international crisis recurrence.2 By 
passive impact, I refer to those elements that IOs offer without actually intervening in a 
conflict, such as communication forums, information provision in the background, 
                                                           
1 I use the definition of international crisis from Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997, 4): a crisis may pertain to 
hostile, verbal, or physical interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of 
military hostilities. Hence, all crises in my data are of an international and interstate character. 
2 Hence, I do not address the effect that IOs may have by intervening in an international crisis. I focus on 
mechanisms that are able to “heal” states’ rivalries and potentially prevent the stage of intervention more 
indirectly (or passively) in order to examine crisis recurrence. IOs’ membership primarily encourages 
cooperation among states and, therefore, offers peace and good relations (Shannon 2009). I thus focus more 
on the functional role of IOs (Keohane 1984): hence, I do not assume an independent role for IOs and see 
IOs more as an “information arena” or forum for exchange. 
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reputational effects, and preemptive policies. For this research, I define IOs as formal 
institutions with at least three member states (Pevehouse et al. 2004).  
IOs are characterized by various mandates that define their purpose, and different 
classifications of IOs help identify what the impact of specific IOs in international crises 
may be. The existing literature has examined the impact of IOs on crisis onset and in the 
context of militarized interstate disputes (Boehmer et al. 2004; Shannon 2009), but little 
attention has been paid to crisis recurrence. Moreover, while my analysis first considers 
all IOs (regardless of their mandate), I also examine the impact of those IOs that are 
potentially more skilled and have more expertise in the passive promotion of peace, i.e., 
peace-brokering IOs (Shannon 2009). To further examine thoroughly the significance of 
IOs’ mandates, I further disaggregate peace-brokering IOs into security IOs and non-
security IOs. Eventually, this study reveals what IOs are most likely to reduce the risk of 
crisis recurrence.  
In light of this, I contribute to the previous literature by analyzing whether states’ 
memberships in IOs have an impact on international crisis recurrence and, more 
specifically, how these patterns look like when disaggregating IOs according to their 
mandate i.e., the expertise they have. While crisis onset and crisis recurrence have many 
similarities, when a pair of states experiences a conflict, the actors become predisposed 
towards their opponents that might be dangerous for post-conflict stability. Therefore, 
recurrent conflicts might be more severe and intense than earlier disputes. In the words of 
Walter (2004), “conflict begets conflict.” In line with Hewitt (2003), Quinn et al. (2007), 
Kreutz (2010) or Mason et al. (2011), this highlights then additionally the importance of 
 
 
3 
conflict recurrence: many outbreaks of conflict are recurrences of a past conflict rather 
than “new” disputes. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, I illustrate more thoroughly 
how crisis recurrence differs from crisis onset, and I provide a review of the determinants 
of crisis non-recurrence i.e., what are the mechanisms that lower the risk of crisis 
recurrence. Second, I outline the theoretical argument behind the impact of IOs on states’ 
relations and crisis prevention. Next, I describe the research design, the model, and the 
variables employed for the empirical analysis. The last section presents the results, before 
I conclude with a discussion of the findings and the avenues for further research. 
 
Crisis after crisis 
A peace agreement does not necessarily lead to the resolution of a crisis. Sometimes, 
underlying issues remain unresolved. As a result, we might observe the outbreak of 
another crisis between the same actors for the same underlying reasons, but due to a new 
trigger (Hensel 1994; Vasquez 2000). Against this background, Colaresi and Thompson 
(2002) argue that past and future crises are interrelated, because the initial cause keeps 
states in ambivalent relationships that can still increase the risk of another crisis. The 
important question that can be derived from this is: what causes a crisis between two 
actors to break out for another time? 
The debate over whether previous and future crises are related to each other or not has 
led to different assumptions about prior crises and their effects. This study shows that the 
existing literature is divided into two different approaches. The first posits that states, 
which already experienced a crisis, tend to be more prone to see another (a new crisis 
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being related to the previous one) (Hensel 1994, 1995; Vasquez 2000; Colaresi and 
Thompson 2002). The second approach contends that states learn from their experience, 
and past crises can then make future crises less likely. Through repeated crises, actors 
become more experienced and uncertainty is reduced (Wagner 2000). Interaction 
between the same actors means that the disputants know their opponents, as well as their 
strategies, and they can more accurately predict future movements. When actors do not 
know their opponents’ intentions, they are more uncertain about the relations between 
one another, which increase the risk of crisis recurrence (Gartzke and Simon 1999).  
This debate differentiates crisis onset from crisis recurrence. Both concepts clearly 
have things in common since crises onset and crises recurrence may be given due to 
similar circumstances (Walter 2004; Quinn et al. 2007; Mason et al. 2011). In addition, 
every case of crisis recurrence is a case of crisis onset, but not the other way around. 
However, despite their similarity, crisis recurrence substantially differs from crisis onset 
and, hence, merits special attention (Grieco 2001; Walter 2004; Quinn et al. 2007; Mason 
et al. 2011). As demonstrated in the literature (e.g., Walter 2004; Quinn et al. 2007; 
Kreutz 2010; Mason et al. 2011; Rustad and Binningsbø 2012), crisis recurrence differs 
from crisis onset mainly since the actors have interacted in a conflict in the past, 
potentially due to the same reasons. This past interaction determines states’ behavior and 
future choices. In essence, crisis recurrence is the continuation of a crisis onset, when 
actors fail to permanently end an initial disagreement (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Goertz et 
al. 2005). Moreover, since actors learn from their past experience, the knowledge of 
actors, the information on their opponents, their incentive structure, and the overall 
circumstances in the context of crisis recurrence frequently differ from those of crisis 
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onset. While I do not seek to underestimate the importance of crisis onset by focusing on 
crisis recurrence, I aim at examining thoroughly the determinants, and to measure the 
predictability of crisis recurrence considering IO influence.  
As in the case of the original reasons for the first crisis to break out, commitment 
problems and information asymmetry are also associated with crisis recurrence (Fearon 
1995; see also Voeten 2013). Therefore, every mechanism that reduces uncertainty 
between states can be considered a way of easing a crisis and lowering the risk of 
recurrence. The literature identified several mechanisms that address these issues. Among 
these factors are democratic forms of government, globalization, or trade ties (see Chan 
1997; Gleditsch 1992; Oneal and Russett 1999; Oneal et al. 2003; Weede 2005; Gartzke 
2007; Böhmelt 2010; Gartzke and Hewitt 2010). In general, these studies find that states 
can maintain good relations via different channels and for various purposes. Boehmer et 
al. (2004) particularly focus on the features of IOs that are likely to be effective in 
eliminating crises. These scholars argue that institutionalized IOs have an informational 
impact on states that reduces the likelihood of an international crisis, because these IOs 
then have the capacity to reduce uncertainty. At the same time, institutionalized IOs are 
creating commitments for states, thereby promoting cooperation and good relations 
(Boehmer et al. 2004).  
 
Peace through IOs 
At least since World War II, there has been an increase in states forming and joining IOs. 
States join IOs for efficiency gains, legitimacy reasons, or, more generally, to reduce 
transaction costs, and promote cooperation (see also Keohane 1984; Fearon 1998; Beth 
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2000; Voeten 2001; Hawkins et al. 2006; Dorussen and Ward 2008, 2010). Some IOs 
only take more narrowly defined roles (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a 
military alliance), while others may cover a wider range of tasks (e.g., United Nations or 
the European Union). In general, states use IOs as instruments in order to fulfill their 
interests (Archer 2015, 114), and, as indicated above, I follow Dorussen and Ward (2008, 
2010), among others, and do not assume an independent role for them (see also Keohane 
1984).3 
IOs may also specifically deal with matters of conflict and peace (e.g., Haas 1983; 
Boehmer et al. 2004; Shannon 2009). They act as third-party actors in a conflict to settle 
it or secure post-conflict stability, and they can help states to prevent conflict in the first 
place (Kadera and Mitchell 2006; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). To this end, IOs can be 
passive and active mediators.4 On one hand, IOs are active mediators when they get 
directly involved in peace and conflict bargaining (Mitchell and Hensel 2007). An IO 
actively intervenes when there is a crisis to be settled by helping states to implement 
policies aiming to build peaceful relations among their members through an enforcement, 
management, and authoritarian approach (Joachim et al. 2008: 6-10; see also Hansen et 
al. 2008). States enter a crisis when bargaining by the belligerents fails to satisfy their 
interests (Fearon 1998; Powell 2002; Boehmer et al. 2004; Pevehouse and Russett 2006; 
Haftel 2007; Hansen et al. 2008; Shannon 2009; Shannon et al. 2010). IOs operating 
under the active approach may systematically facilitate bargaining and secure a solution 
                                                           
3 In this context, Dreher et al. (2015), for example, argue that membership in IOs signals to potential 
investors more benign policies and a more stable political environment, which ultimately increases foreign 
direct investment (FDI) inflows. 
4 A mediator is defined as a party that offers non-violent third-party assistance to resolve a crisis peacefully 
(Bercovitch et al. 1991; Bercovitch 1996: 3). 
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for the belligerents due to resources, leverage, and legitimacy elements (e.g., Tallberg et 
al. 2013) in the form of, e.g., mediation, arbitration, and adjudication (Mitchel and Hensel 
2007; Boehmer et al. 2004; Shannon 2009). For example, the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has established the Minsk group as an effort to find 
a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Caucasus. 
On the other hand, and this is my focus on in this paper, IOs can also passively 
encourage states’ cooperation. A passive influence of IOs refers to all those elements that 
IOs offer without actively intervening in a conflict, and we see these elements then 
primarily in times of non-crisis. Specifically, IOs provide platforms and forums for their 
members that these use to communicate and exchange ideas or perceptions. An active or 
direct involvement of the IO is not given here, however. IOs passively increase 
interaction opportunities, which lengthens the shadow of the future and raises the 
reputation costs for the belligerents for violating an agreement (Mitchell and Hensel 
2007). Also, by promoting information passively, uncertainty is lower, and the 
probability of a crisis is reduced (see also Fearon 1995). From a constructivist point of 
view, Dorussen and Ward (2008, 2010) argue that IOs serve as vehicles of 
communication between members, building trust and social capital among them. That is, 
frequent interactions in IOs can lead states redefine their social identities in less 
conflictual terms (see also Koremenos et al. 2001: 786). Along these lines, political 
psychologists have examined the impact of images and perceptions in foreign policy. 
They argue that interactions via IOs contribute to changing state elites’ images of other 
decision makers, potentially changing an “enemy” image to a more benign one (Cottam R 
1977, 62; Cottam M 1994, 32). Another explanation on the role of IOs is derived by the 
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liberalist approach suggesting that IOs create trade links that strengthen the domestic 
interests in favor of good bilateral relations opposed to conflict (Moravscik 1993, 1997). 
That is, states are less likely to challenge peace in the short run if they anticipate 
significant future interaction opportunities and they value the payoffs from those 
interactions. Ultimately, if a conflict escalates, the various linkages created via IOs’ 
passive elements were not able to maintain peaceful relations. 
Against the background of this general overview of IO’s active and passive roles, I 
examine the passive role of IOs and study how states’ co-memberships in IOs affect the 
risk of crisis recurrence.5 IOs’ passive mechanisms (i.e., joint membership in this study) 
are likely to exert an influence across conflict onset, duration, termination, and 
recurrence. This means that the passive mechanisms in a first crisis are also likely to be 
given in a later crisis. However, IOs’ passive influence can build and capitalize on the 
information and experience accumulated since the previous crisis and as a result make an 
impact on crisis recurrence. I focus on three interrelated arguments to develop this claim. 
First, shared memberships in and increased interactions via IOs not only provide 
information through multiple channels (see also Dorussen and Ward 2008, 2010), but 
also align member states’ preferences, which reduces the risk that disputants will seek to 
challenge peace (Werner 1999; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). In turn, repeated interactions 
in IOs raise the stakes for future interactions, which may make existing peace hard to 
challenge, and bargains that were reached more durable (Fearon 1998; Mitchell and 
Hensel 2007).  
                                                           
5 See Chapman and Wolford (2010) who focus on the active elements of IOs when examining conflict 
recurrence. 
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Second, IOs deter conflict (Shannon 2009). Abbott and Snidal (1998, 26) describe this 
feature of IOs when highlighting that “they increase the prospect of continued interaction, 
often across issues, and generalize reputational effects of reneging across members of the 
organization.” Therefore, when states share memberships in IOs, they are less likely to 
risk peace and stability with other member-states for securing further interactions.  
Third, IOs promote preemptive policies aiming at securing peace and stability, thereby 
altering states’ conflicting interests. For instance, IOs prevent conflict by legitimating 
collective decisions and changing perceptions of identity and self-interest (Deutsch 1957; 
Stone et al. 1998; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; Gartzke et al. 2001; Russett and Oneal 
2001; Pevehouse and Russett 2006). This discussion leads to the formulation of the first 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Dyads with more joint memberships in IOs have a lower risk of 
international crisis recurrence than dyads with fewer joint memberships in IOs. 
 
Note, however, that IOs have different issue areas. Some, but not all IOs are formed 
with the explicit purpose of helping countries to peacefully manage their grievances 
(Haas 1983; Shannon 2009). Following this, I examine those IOs that are actually related 
to conflict and more likely to address security aspects as such, thereby potentially in a 
better position to passively reduce the risk of crisis recurrence than other IOs with a 
different agenda. In line with this rationale, Boehmer et al. (2004), for instance, argue 
that IOs require a certain degree of institutional structure in order to effectively intervene 
in conflicts and, thus, divide IOs according to their degree of institutionalization: minimal 
(having meetings and information gathering), structured (having policy agendas), and 
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interventionist (having mediation mechanisms). Boehmer et al. (2004) examine the 
direct, i.e., interventionist, attempts by IOs to resolve interstate conflicts.  
Due to the focus of my study on the passive influences of IOs, though, disaggregating 
IOs along the degrees of institutionalization may not be the most adequate approach. 
Instead, I rely on a different disaggregation by focusing on those characteristics of IOs 
that are arguably more important for the passive role of IOs in crisis prevention: what IOs 
are or represent. I make use of the classification in Shannon (2009) who defines peace-
brokering IOs as those IOs that can provide information and have the capacities to offer 
mediation (see Table 1 for peace-brokering IOs). These IOs are highly institutionalized, 
and they are likely to encourage their members to manage disputes. They mandate 
peaceful relations within their ranks and incorporate dispute settlement mechanisms into 
their charters (Shannon 2009). If peace-brokering IOs are indeed able to provide 
information, manage states’ conflicting interests, and even resolve states’ disputes by 
actively intervening in conflicts (Shannon 2009), they might also be able to offer their 
expertise passively – and before the recurrence of a crisis (see also Shannon 2009, 2010): 
Hypothesis 2: Dyads with more joint memberships in peace-brokering IOs are less 
likely to see international crisis recurrence than dyads with fewer joint memberships in 
peace-brokering IOs. 
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Table 1. Security and non-security peace-brokering IOs 
Security IOs 
     
Non-security IOs 
Name Abbreviation Name Abbreviation 
African Union AU Andean Community ANDEAN 
Association of 
Southeast Asian 
Nations 
ASEAN Economic Community 
of Central African 
States 
ECCAS 
Commonwealth of 
Independent States 
Charter 
CIS Economic Community 
of West African States 
ECOWAS 
European Union EU Caribbean Commission CARICOM 
League of Arab 
States 
LOAS Council of Europe COE 
North Atlantic Treaty NATO Nordic Council of 
Ministers 
NCM 
Organization for 
Security and 
Cooperation in 
Europe 
OSCE Organization of 
American States 
OAS 
Organization of 
African Unity 
OAU Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States 
OECS 
United Nations UN Organization of the 
Islamic conference 
OIC 
Western European 
Union 
WEU Permanent Court of 
Arbitration 
PCA 
Warsaw Pact WPact Southern African 
Development 
Community 
SADC 
 
Note: The information on the peace-brokering IOs is from Shannon (2009). The security and non-
security classification is based on information gathered from the IOs’ websites: security IOs have 
a reference to military issues according to their scope.  
 
I also disaggregate the peace-brokering IOs into IOs with security and IOs with a non-
security mandate. A security IO is a peace-brokering IO, but not necessarily the other 
way round. Security IOs offer the elements that peace-brokering IOs offer, but they have 
a more specific agenda on security (military) issues. Security IOs are more likely to 
compel members to peacefully settle than strictly economic institutions (Shannon 2009).6 
Security IOs mostly focus on consulting states about security issues that concern either 
                                                           
6 Previous studies have examined security IOs in relation to militarized interstate disputes by examining 
IOs’ security skills during an intervention and, therefore, the actual involvement of IOs (Barnett and 
Finnemore 1999; Boehmer et al. 2004). 
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domestic or international threats. In other words, a security IO clearly states the focus on 
security-related information. NATO, for example, expresses that it is a “political and 
military” alliance and its essential purpose is “to safeguard the freedom and security of its 
members through political and military means.”7 I expect that co-memberships in peace-
brokering security IOs reduce the risk of crisis recurrence even more primarily as they 
offer more relevant security and military-related information. And this should facilitate 
lowering uncertainty even more. In addition, security peace-brokering IOs can promote 
ex-ante peace agreements and, thus, increase commitments for their members. For 
instance, NATO is a military alliance that explicitly states the collective defense principle 
that ultimately encourages member states to maintain peaceful relations. No direct 
engagement is given, but the principle as such is likely to have a significant passive 
effect. I, therefore, expect that the effect of peace-brokering security IOs is larger than the 
effect of peace-brokering IOs that offer less specific elements of security information. 
Table 1 presents what are the peace-brokering IOs that qualify as security and non- 
security ones. 
Hypothesis 3: Dyads with more joint memberships in security peace-brokering IOs are 
less likely to see international crisis recurrence than dyads with fewer joint memberships 
in security peace-brokering IOs. 
 
 
 
                                                           
7 A non-security IO majors on other areas, e.g., economic growth, social progress, or cultural development 
for its members, but without a military focus in their scope. For example, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) aims to “to facilitate arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution between states.” In 
this case, there is no reference to military means. 
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Research design 
I employ probit regression models to analyze time-series cross-sectional data for 
examining the relationship between international crisis recurrence (binary dependent 
variable) and IO co-memberships either aggregated or disaggregated into peace-
brokering IOs and security peace-brokering IOs (main explanatory variables).8 My 
sample includes yearly observations of undirected dyads,9 which (as a pair) already 
experienced at least one international crisis between 1950 and 2008. I focus on the post-
World War II era, since most IOs were established during that time. 
  
Dependent variable – Crisis recurrence 
The focus of this study is the prevention of another international crisis between states that 
have seen the outbreak of a crisis in the past. To this end, I am interested in capturing 
conflictive behavior at the “early stages.” The Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data 
(Faten et al. 2004) provide information on military threats and conflicts that eventually 
turn violent. This, however, is usually after crisis initiation.  
The dependent variable in my study, crisis recurrence, captures the recurrence of an 
international crisis. I use the dyadic version of the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) 
data set (Hewitt 2003). When the same conflict actors, which already experienced one 
crisis according to the ICB data, get involved in a second, third, etc. international crisis 
over the same underlying issue, this is coded as recurrence. The variable receives a value 
of 1 and 0, respectively, depending on whether the crisis recurred or not.  
                                                           
8 This setting is similar to discrete duration data. When replacing the logistic regression by a duration 
model, the results remain qualitatively the same. 
9 Including directed dyads would artificially increase the number of observations and decrease the size of 
the standard errors. 
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Core explanatory variables  
The first core explanatory variable refers to the number of joint IO memberships for the 
pair of states in a dyad. This variable measures the count of co-memberships in any IO 
for each state dyad from 1950 to 2008. The data for the IOs are taken from the Correlates 
of War project (COW) (Pevehouse et al. 2004). The COW IO membership data are 
recorded in five-year intervals prior to 1965. I filled in missing values using linear 
interpolation. I also filled in the missing values after 2005 that is the end date of the 
COW dataset. The variable shared memberships in IOs ranges from 0 (no shared 
membership) to 76 with a mean value of 30.05. 
Furthermore, I disaggregate IOs along their expertise. I follow Shannon (2009, 149): 
 “to appropriately test the relationship between IOs and peaceful conflict 
resolution, I select organizations according to two criteria: they must be 
highly institutionalized, and they must be likely to encourage their members 
to manage disputes. Using data obtained from Boehmer et al. (2004), I first 
choose organizations with security mandates, as they are more likely to 
compel members to peacefully settle than strictly economic or functional 
institutions. Among these security organizations, I include those that score 
the highest on a 3-point scale of institutionalization, since highly structured 
organizations have the most influence on member behavior (Koremenos et 
al., 2001). Then, to complete the list of relevant organizations, I consulted 
the Issue Correlates of War Project’s Mulitlateral Treaties of Pacific 
Settlement (MTOPS) data (Hensel, 2003). I turn to this second source 
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because Boehmer et al.’s data are not exhaustive, measuring the 
institutionalization and mandates of only a select group of IOs. Using the 
MTOPS data and their charters, I identify organizations that specifically call 
for peaceful settlement and have the ability to diplomatically intervene in 
members’ disputes. I cross-reference the institutions with the Correlates of 
War Intergovernmental Organizations data to make sure that these are 
organizations with three or more members, permanent secretariats, and 
regular meetings (Pevehouse et al., 2004). The procedures narrow the 
universe of IOs to 27 institutions […]. I term the institutions Peace 
Brokering Organizations.”  
That is, first I focus on a category of IOs that have the ability to provide information 
(peace-brokering IOs). These IOs have resources and diplomatic leverage that can rebuild 
states’ peaceful relations (Shannon 2009). I then disaggregate peace-brokering IOs 
further into security and non-security IOs. A security peace-brokering IO not only has the 
elements of peace-brokering IOs, but also expertise on security matters. I identify this 
with own compiled data on whether military means (or issues and instruments) are 
explicitly mentioned in IO charters. The variable shared memberships in peace-brokering 
IOs ranges from 0 (no shared membership or no shared membership in peace-brokering 
IO) to 8 with a mean value of 2.54. Shared security peace-brokering IO memberships 
ranges from 0 (no shared membership or no shared membership in security peace-
brokering IO) to 4 with a mean value of 1.04.10 
                                                           
10 For making use of all available information, these shared-membership variables referring to memberships 
are counts: the total number of joint IO memberships for each pair of states in each year.  For instance, the 
dyad of the United States-Angola does not share membership in an IO in 1975. A year later, this pair of 
states shares five memberships in IOs and a year afterwards they are joint members in eight IOs. Also, note 
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Control covariates 
In addition to joint memberships in international organizations, I expect other factors to 
influence crisis recurrence. By controlling for alternative determinants of my outcome 
variable, I address the issue of omitted variable bias. Moreover, most of the following 
controls are also correlated with the main explanatory variables (shared membership in 
IOs, peace-brokering, and security IOs), which allows me to address the issue of selection 
bias to a large extent (selection on observables). First, following Colaresi and Thompson 
(2002) or Gleditsch (1992), I control for the influence of regime type by considering 
whether two states in a dyad are jointly democratic. I use the Polity IV data (Marshall et 
al. 2010). Several studies find that democracies are less likely to experience a crisis in the 
first place (e.g., Oneal and Russett 1999; Shannon et al. 2010). In addition, particularly 
democracies join and participate in multilateral cooperative agreements such as IOs (see 
Elsig et al. 2011). Following Beardsley (2008) or Shannon et al. (2010), joint democracy 
is defined as both states in a dyad having a polity2 score of 6 or higher. 
Second, I make use of a log-transformed version of the Composite Index of National 
Capability Score to create the capability ratio of the dyad under study. This controls for 
capabilities. On one hand, more asymmetric dyads are more likely to see crisis 
recurrence; on the other hand, power distribution also affects IO membership, since more 
powerful states are usually more active in international politics and, hence, more engaged 
in IOs (Dorussen and Ward 2008). The data are taken from the Correlates of War (COW) 
project’s data on national material capabilities (Singer et al. 1972; Singer 1987).  
                                                                                                                                                                              
that I provide additional statistical models employing all the different baseline combinations to examine the 
robustness of the results in the appendix. 
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Third, distance between states is also a determinant of crisis recurrence. 
Geographically distant states have a lower probability of getting involved in a conflict. At 
the same time, geographically distant countries have fewer interests in forming 
collaborations. Following previous studies (e.g., Oneal and Russett 1999; Boehmer et al. 
2004), I thus control for contiguity, which is a dummy variable coded as 1 when a pair of 
states shares a land or river border (0 otherwise). The data for this variable are taken from 
the COW project’s data on direct contiguity (Stinnett et al. 2002).  
Fourth, in line with Beardsley (2008), I control for the severity of the previous crisis. 
The severity, and thus the costs, of an earlier crisis may affect the (non-) recurrence of a 
subsequent crisis. Additionally, a state’s decision to join an IO may also be influenced by 
a previous crisis’s severity – the more intense the earlier conflict, the more willing a 
country may be to signal good intentions or seek to get assistance from abroad in a post-
conflict situation; IOs can help here.  To this end, I include an ordinal severity variable 
that captures no violence (1), minor clashes (2), serious clashes (3), and full-scale war 
(4). The data for this item are taken from the ICB project (Brecher et al. 2016). 
Fifth, there is the importance of ethnicity, and I take a variable that captures the 
existence of an ethnic component in the previous crisis. It codes whether there was either 
as a secessionist conflict (1), an irredentist conflict (2), or a no ethnic conflict (3). This 
ultimately controls for “the salience of the crisis domestically and thus captures the 
pressure on the states to reach more favorable terms” (Beardsley 2008, 732), and thus for 
an alternative mechanism behind crisis recurrence. The information for this variable is 
taken from the ICB dataset (Brecher et al. 2016). 
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Another exogenous factor that may affect crisis recurrence is the interest of third-party 
actors in a crisis (Beardsley 2008). To this end, a location that is of particular importance 
to outside actors due to, e.g., natural resources, might be prone to see one crisis after 
another. Moreover, states in such a region might also be more active in the international 
system, and this correlates with IO membership. For this reason, I also control for the 
salience of the geostrategic position of the previous crisis that is measured by the level 
and number of international systems that are affected by a crisis. This information is 
coded in the ICB dataset (Brecher et al. 2016) on a five-point scale (from one subsystem 
to global system).  
Finally, states that have peaceful relations for years are more likely to maintain peace 
and could also be more likely to collaborate in the international system and thus, share IO 
memberships. Hence, along the lines of Boehmer et al. (2004), I control the time elapsed 
since the last crisis onset using cubic polynomials (Carter and Signorino 2010). 
 
Empirical findings 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables discussed so far as well as 
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of the explanatory items. According to the VIFs, 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major issue, since all VIFs are well below the 
common threshold value of 5 (O’Brian 2007).  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and VIF 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max VIF 
Crisis recurrence 9,025 0.06 0.24 0 1  
Shared IO memberships 9,025 30.05 15.61 0 76 1.92 
Shared peace-brokering 
IO memberships 
9,025  2.54 1.73 0 8 4.51 
Shared security peace-
brokering IO 
memberships 
9,025  1.04 0.81 0 4 3.56 
Joint democracy 8,376  0.04 0.20 0 1 1.11 
Contiguity 9,025  0.29 0.45 0 1 1.32 
National material 
capabilities ln  
8,789  1.48 1.57 0.01 10.87 1.10 
Violence  9,025  2.67 1.06 1 4 1.14 
Geostrategic salience 9,025  2.58 1.71 1 5 1.56 
Ethnic component 9,025  2.66 0.64 1 3 1.14 
Notes: The core explanatory variables (i.e., count of IOs, count of peace-brokering IOs, and the count of security 
IOs) are used in separate models.   
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Table 3.  Crisis recurrence and IO memberships 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Shared IO memberships            -0.01***   
 
(0.00)   
Shared peace-brokering IO 
memberships 
 
-0.08***  
 
 
(0.01)  
Shared security IO memberships 
 
       -0.15*** 
 
 
   (0.03) 
Joint democracy 0.17          0.09 0.02 
 
(0.10) (0.11)   (0.12) 
Contiguity 0.12***      0.10**     0.11** 
 
(0.04) (0.04)   (0.04) 
National material capabilities ln -0.00          -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01)          (0.01)    (0.01) 
Violence 0.05*          0.07***    0.06** 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    (0.02) 
Geostrategic salience -0.05**          -0.05**       -0.05** 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    (0.02) 
Ethnic component 0.01          0.02 0.01 
 
(0.04) (0.04)    (0.04) 
t -0.35***          -0.35***          -0.35*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02)      (0.02) 
t2 0.02***          0.01***          0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) 
t3 -0.01***          -0.01***          -0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) 
Constant   - 0.14       -0.29*        -0.27* 
 (0.16) (0.15)    (0.15) 
Obs. 7,959 7,959 7,959 
Pseudo-R2  0.33 0.33 0.33 
Wald Chi2 615.44 539.84 538.91 
        Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
                  
Table 3 summarizes the results of the probit models on the relationship between crisis 
recurrence and IO shared memberships. Model 1 estimates the risk of recurrence of an 
international crisis using the count of shared IO memberships as the main explanatory 
variable. Model 2 focuses on the count of shared peace-brokering IO memberships and 
Model 3 studies the effect of security peace-brokering IOs. The analyses reveal a 
negative relationship between crisis recurrence and the count of shared memberships in 
IOs, peace-brokering IOs, and security peace-brokering IOs, respectively. The 
coefficients of all core explanatory variables are statistically significant (Table 3). The 
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negative coefficient sign indicates that, as dyads share more memberships in IOs, they 
have a lower risk of experiencing another international crisis, a result that matches the 
expectations from the first hypothesis. Also, states that share fewer memberships in 
peace-brokering IOs (or no memberships at all) have a higher likelihood to experience 
crisis recurrence (Hypothesis 2).11 Along the expectations of Hypothesis 3, states that 
share fewer memberships in security peace-brokering IOs (or no memberships at all), 
have a higher likelihood to see crisis recurrence. To offer a clear understanding of the 
baseline category, I also examined the combinations of (1) shared memberships in 
security peace-brokering IOs and no shared memberships, (2) shared membership in 
security peace-brokering IOs and shared memberships in other IOs, and (3) shared 
membership in security peace-brokering and shared membership in peace-brokering IOs. 
The results remain qualitatively the same: more shared membership in security peace-
brokering IOs decrease the likelihood of crisis recurrence (see appendix for details). 
 In general, fewer shared memberships pertain to fewer links between states and, as a 
result, a higher probability for tensions and rivalries (Dorussen and Ward 2008). A large 
number of connections through IOs reduces the risk of crisis recurrence. At the same 
time, when states establish collaborative ties (i.e., a state becomes member in an IO) after 
a crisis, it indicates that they are willing to build a peaceful environment of cooperation 
and development with their former opponents. Such arguments hold when examining the 
disaggregated effects of IOs. Institutions that offer dispute resolution, by providing 
information and even information on security matters as such, decrease the likelihood of 
                                                           
11 In addition, the appendix estimates the risk of recurrence when the baseline category is defined in a less 
ambiguous way: combinations of (1) shared memberships in peace-brokering IOs and no shared 
memberships, and (2) shared membership in peace-brokering IOs and shared memberships in other IOs. 
The results stay qualitatively the same; more shared memberships in peace-brokering IOs decrease the 
likelihood of crisis recurrence. 
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crisis recurrence for their members. Information reduces uncertainty, and thus, states’ 
incentives in challenging peace again.  
I have calculated the predicted probabilities of crisis recurrence in relation to shared 
IO memberships (Figures 1-3). The risk of crisis recurrence decreases as the number of 
shared memberships of states in IOs increase. Along with the theoretical expectations of 
this study, pairs of states that are linked via IOs should have a lower risk to experience an 
international crisis again. That being said, pairs of states with no such mechanisms have a 
higher probability of getting involved in another international crisis. This finding refers to 
all types of IOs (Figure 1), and the results hold when I focus on peace-brokering IOs 
(Figure 2) or security peace-brokering IOs (Figure 3). Therefore, the risk of crisis 
recurrence decreases when states share memberships in IOs – regardless of their mandate. 
That is, any type of IO is able to generate links among states, promote cooperation and 
peaceful relations. In addition, the expertise of an IO (peace-brokering or security peace-
brokering IOs in this case) is not that necessary when discussing the passive elements of 
IOs. Interestingly then, when an IO actively intervenes in resolving a conflict, the 
expertise is considered necessary according to the previous literature (Boehmer et al. 
2004; Shannon 2009). 
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Figure 1. Crisis recurrence and IO shared memberships 
Notes: Solid line captures predicted probability point estimates. Dashed lines pertain to 90% 
confidence intervals. Graph based on Model 1 (Table 2).  
 
Figure 2. Crisis recurrence and peace-brokering IO shared memberships 
Notes: Solid line captures predicted probability point estimates. Dashed lines pertain to 90% 
confidence intervals. Graph based on Model 2 (Table 2).  
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Figure 3. Crisis recurrence and security IO shared memberships  
Notes: Solid line captures predicted probability point estimates. Dashed lines pertain to 90% 
confidence intervals. Graph based on Model 3 (Table 2).  
 
The previous literature has shown that the mandate of an IO matters for reducing 
militarized interstate disputes (Boehmer et al. 2004; Shannon 2009). Yet, the results of 
this analysis underline that the mandate of an IO does not seem to be that crucial for 
lowering tensions in crises and particularly in preventing crisis recurrence. To a large 
extent, this means that IOs facilitate states’ relations via a forum of communication that 
they provide. After running t-tests on the predicted probabilities of crisis recurrence 
across different combinations of IO memberships (i.e., IOs and peace-brokering IOs; IOs 
and peace-brokering security IOs; peace-brokering and security peace brokering IOs), 
there is no statistically significant difference across the different categories of IOs. 
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    Figure 4. Effects of shared IO memberships – First differences 
Notes:  Horizontal bars show first difference 90% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 4 also shows the effects of the different types of IOs on crisis recurrence with 
first differences for each IO category. A first difference is defined as the change in the 
predicted probability of crisis recurrence when changing a variable of interest from the 
minimum to the maximum, while holding all other variables (i.e., control variables) at 
their median values. In general, shared IO memberships significantly decrease the risk of 
crisis recurrence. However, the fact that the confidence intervals of the three IOs 
categories overlap means that the different categories of IOs examined here are not 
significantly different from each other. Hence, the impact of all types of IOs on crisis 
recurrence is ultimately the same, with the mandate of IOs having not a major influence 
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on crisis recurrence. Shared memberships in peace-brokering and security-peace 
brokering IOs have a similar impact on preventing crisis recurrence. To this end, the 
diplomatic expertise of an IO does not play a primary role in preventing crisis recurrence. 
In other words, states should share memberships in any type of IO in order to maintain 
peaceful relations. The diplomatic expertise is probably more relevant when a crisis starts 
or an IO actively intervenes. In order to reduce crisis recurrence, states need to rebuild 
and maintain friendly relations, but this can be achieved through all sorts of cooperation 
and links that IOs offer – a focus on security, military, or peace-brokering as such does 
not seem mandatory. 
To ensure the robustness of the relationship between shared memberships in peace-
brokering IOs and crisis recurrence, I control for a number of factors.12 With regards to 
the control variables, all control covariates display consistent effects and significance 
levels across the models (Table 3). That is, joint democracy, the capability ratio, national 
material capabilities, or the ethnic component are not significantly related to crisis 
recurrence. That said, contiguity is a significant determinant of crisis recurrence: non-
contiguous states have a lower risk of experiencing crisis recurrence. Regarding the 
violence item, the models indicate that the higher the level of violence in an earlier crisis, 
the higher the risk of crisis recurrence. Intense crises are not forgotten or resolved easily 
and, as a consequence, actors may trigger further incidents. The variable of geostrategic 
salience has a significant effect on crisis recurrence, indicating that the importance of a 
conflict affects the risk of recurrence.13 Finally, time dependency is also a determinant of 
                                                           
12 See the appendix (Tables 3, 5 and 6) for robustness checks including more control variables i.e., the types 
of outcomes, bilateral trade, indirect links, and democracy score of the weakest link. 
13 See the appendix (Table 4) for a detailed analysis when employing the severity of the previous crisis, the 
item of geostrategic salience, and the ethnic component in a binary format. 
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crisis recurrence. Figure 5 graphs the relationship between peace duration and crisis 
recurrence. It illustrates the likelihood of crisis recurrence, as a function of t, t2, and t3 
while all other variables are hold at their mean levels. The figure portrays that the 
baseline hazard decreases rapidly with time. The pattern is virtually the same across all 
models in Table 3. 
 
 
Figure 5. Predicted probability of Crisis Recurrence over time 
Notes: Shaded area pertains to 90% confidence interval. Solid black line captures predicted 
probability point estimates. Graph based on Model 1. The results remain qualitatively the same 
for Models 2-3. 
 
Note that membership in IOs occurs under certain circumstances, when for example 
there is a need for the state to join an IO, and this increases the risk of endogenous results 
(Rubin 1991). Ignoring this may underestimate or overestimate the effect of the 
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remaining explanatory variables. A selection effect is based to the reality that cases that 
see shared membership in a peace-brokering IO are not a random set and, thus, one must 
take into consideration the first stage of selection due to the reason that factors leading to 
membership in an IO may also affect the outcome of crisis. Under these conditions, if the 
two processes are not captured jointly, the results of the analysis might be biased. A 
bivariate probit analysis controls for selection effects in this study, and I provide such an 
analysis in the appendix (Table 8). 
 
Conclusion 
Previous research identified the possibility that IOs might be associated with promoting 
peace when they fulfill specific conditions, i.e., institutionalized or peace-brokering IOs 
(Boehmer et al. 2004; Shannon 2009; Shannon et al. 2010). This paper focused on the 
more passive role of IOs and demonstrated that all IOs – regardless of their scope or 
mandate – contribute similarly to the non-failure of peace and prevention of a future 
crisis when focusing on joint memberships. Ultimately, IOs offer prevention mechanisms 
that strengthen states’ relations regardless of their expertise in some policy area.  
Different claims and findings about the effect of IOs on international crises can mainly 
be accredited to the predisposition to treat IOs as non-equivalent; IOs are not equal or 
some IOs are more important than others (Boehmer et al. 2004; Hansen et al. 2008). 
Having examined the impact of IOs, in an aggregated and a disaggregated way, on crisis 
recurrence, this study found encouraging results. My results have shown that more shared 
memberships in IOs decrease the risk of crisis recurrence. To this end, multiple channels 
of IOs during peacetime reduce uncertainty that could potentially lead to another crisis. 
This result is particularly relevant for former belligerents as it is very difficult to rebuild 
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trust among former combatants. More specific results have been presented for different 
categories of IOs (all IOs, peace brokering and security peace-brokering IOs). Although 
the impact of each category is slightly different on crisis recurrence, there are no 
statistically significant different. The predicted probability of crisis recurrence is 
ultimately similar regardless of the type of IO (or IOs) that a pair of states shares 
membership in. The first differences and the change in the probability of experiencing a 
crisis recurrence underline the findings from the regression table. This means that shared 
IO memberships regardless of type or mandate reduce the risk of crisis recurrence.  
Further research could focus on the mechanisms that IOs apply in order to secure the 
non-violation of agreements and further alleviate crisis recurrence. For example, what is 
the impact of monitoring and enforcement via IOs on maintaining peace? This will 
develop further the theoretical and empirical framework on the overall role of IOs for 
states’ relations and behavior.  
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Appendix 
The main article has explored the disaggregated effects of IOs. The baseline categories of 
these models presented in the main analysis are either no shared membership at all or 
shared membership in non-peace-brokering and non-security peace-brokering IOs, 
respectively. Additional statistical models capture clear-cut combinations of the different 
baseline categories (Table 1). I first examine solely the combinations of (1) shared 
membership in peace-brokering IOs and no shared memberships (Model 1), and (2) 
shared membership in peace-brokering IOs and shared memberships in other IOs (Model 
2). The results stay qualitatively the same as in the main analysis. More shared 
memberships in peace-brokering IOs than no membership or than membership in IOs of a 
different agenda decrease the likelihood of crisis recurrence. I also examined the 
combinations of (1) shared memberships in security peace-brokering IOs and no shared 
IO memberships (Model 3), (2) shared membership in security peace-brokering IOs and 
shared memberships in other IOs (Model 4), and (3) shared membership in security 
peace-brokering and shared membership in peace-brokering IOs (Model 5). Likewise, the 
results show that more shared memberships in security peace-brokering IOs decrease the 
likelihood of crisis recurrence regardless of the baseline category. 
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Table 1.  Crisis recurrence and IO memberships 
 
Model 1 
(baseline: no 
shared IO 
memberships) 
Model 2 
(baseline: shared 
memberships in 
non peace-
brokering IOs) 
Model 3 
(baseline: no 
shared IO 
memberships) 
Model 4 
(baseline: shared   
memberships in 
 non security peace-
brokering IOs) 
Model 5 
(baseline: shared 
memberships in 
peace-brokering 
IOs) 
 
Shared peace-brokering 
IO memberships 
-0.12***  
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01)    
 
 
    
Shared security IO 
memberships 
 
       -0.16***       -0.15***       -0.20*** 
 
 
   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.05) 
Joint democracy 0.14          0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 
(0.13) (0.11)   (0.12)   (0.11)   (0.13) 
Contiguity 0.10**      0.10**     0.15***     0.14**     0.12** 
 
(0.05) (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.05) 
National material 
capabilities ln -0.00          -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01)          (0.01)    (0.02)    (0.01)    (0.01) 
Violence 0.04          0.06**    0.03    0.05*    0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.03) 
Geostrategic salience -0.07***          -0.03*       -0.04       -0.03       -0.04* 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    (0.03)    (0.02)    (0.02) 
Ethnic component -0.02          0.01 0.03 -0.00 -0.05 
 
(0.05) (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.05) 
t 
-0.34***        -0.35*** 
     
     -0.38***          -0.35***          -0.34*** 
 
(0.03) (0.02)      (0.03)      (0.02)      (0.03) 
t2 0.02***          0.01***          0.02***          0.02***          0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)      (0.00)      (0.00)      (0.00) 
t3 
-0.00***       - 0.00*** 
     
     -0.00***          -0.00***          -0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)      (0.00)      (0.00)      (0.00) 
Constant   0.07  -0.28*    -0.08    -0.25    0.10 
 (0.17) (0.15)    (0.18)    (0.16)    (0.19) 
Obs. 6,777 7,602 6,430 7,602 6,415 
Pseudo-R2  0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.32 
Wald Chi2 463.10 518.61 409.25 502.74 413.91 
Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
The number of observations changes depending on the definition of the baseline category.  
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In addition to the control variables presented in the main analysis, I also include two 
variables that refer to the outcome of the previous crisis. That is, I first consider the 
content of the outcome that refers to whether the outcome of an international crisis was 
perceived by the actors to have been definitive or ambiguous. According to the ICB 
dataset (Brecher et al. 2016), a definitive outcome occurs when all actors perceive victory 
or defeat in terms of the achievement of basic goals of a specific crisis. When at least one 
of the crisis actors perceives either stalemate or compromise at the termination point of a 
crisis, this is called an ambiguous outcome. The results in Table 2 indicate that the 
content of a previous crisis outcome is not a significant predictor of crisis recurrence. 
That said, the results for the shared membership main explanatory variables hold and are 
qualitatively the same with the previous analysis. 
I also included the form of the outcome of a previous international crisis at its 
termination point (Table 3). This is a categorical variable: formal agreement, semi-formal 
agreement, tacit understanding, unilateral act, imposed agreement, other, and crisis faded. 
The baseline category in the model is formal agreement. The results show that semi-
formal agreement, unilateral acts and imposed agreements increase the likelihood of 
crisis recurrence (compared to the baseline category of formal agreements) regardless of 
the IOs’ shared membership. This finding is in line with previous studies claiming that 
formal peace agreements and belligerents’ satisfaction on the outcome are more likely to 
long-term peace (Huth 1988; Senese and Quackenbush 2003; Goertz et al. 2005; 
Beardsley 2008).  
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Table 2.  Crisis recurrence and IO memberships 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Shared IO memberships            -0.01***   
 
(0.00)   
Shared peace-brokering IO 
memberships 
 
-0.08***  
 
 
(0.01)  
Shared security IO memberships 
 
       -0.15*** 
 
 
   (0.03) 
Joint democracy 0.16          0.09 0.02 
 
(0.10) (0.11)   (0.12) 
Contiguity 0.12***      0.10**     0.11** 
 
(0.04) (0.04)   (0.05) 
National material capabilities ln -0.00          -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01)          (0.01)    (0.01) 
Violence 0.05*          0.07**    0.06** 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    (0.02) 
Geostrategic salience -0.05**          -0.05**       -0.05** 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    (0.02) 
Ethnic component 0.00          0.02 0.01 
 
(0.04) (0.04)    (0.04) 
Content of outcome -0.00 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) 
t -0.35***          -0.35***          -0.35*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02)      (0.02) 
t2 0.02***          0.02***          0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) 
t3 0.00***          -0.00***          -0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) 
Constant   - 0.13       -0.28*        -0.25 
 (0.16) (0.15)    (0.15) 
Obs. 7,959 7,959 7,959 
Pseudo-R2  0.33 0.33 0.33 
Wald Chi2 618.24 545.55 520.35 
        Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3.  Crisis recurrence and IO memberships 
 
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Shared IO memberships            -0.01***   
 
(0.00)   
Shared peace-brokering IO 
memberships 
 
-0.09***  
 
 
(0.01)  
Shared security IO memberships 
 
       -0.16*** 
 
 
   (0.03) 
Joint democracy 0.15          0.07 -0.00 
 
(0.10) (0.12)   (0.11) 
Contiguity 0.13***      0.10**     0.10** 
 
(0.05) (0.05)   (0.01) 
National material capabilities ln -0.00          -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01)          (0.01)    (0.01) 
Violence 0.04*          0.06**    0.06** 
 
(0.03) (0.03)    (0.03) 
Geostrategic salience -0.05**          -0.04**       -0.04** 
 
(0.02) (0.02)    (0.02) 
Ethnic component 0.00          0.02 0.00 
 
(0.04) (0.04)    (0.04) 
Form of the outcome    
    
Semi-formal agreement 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Tacit understanding -0.00 -0.06 -0.05 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
Unilateral act 0.18*** 0.16** 0.15** 
 (0.06)  (0.07) (0.06) 
Imposed agreement 0.22*** 0.18** 0.16** 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
Other 0.05 0.04 0.06 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Crisis faded 0.11 0.07 0.08 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) 
t -0.35***          -0.35***          -0.35*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02)      (0.02) 
t2 0.02***          0.02***          0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) 
t3 -0.00***          -0.00***          -0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) 
Constant           - 0.21       -0.35**        -0.34** 
 (0.17) (0.16)    (0.16) 
Obs. 7,959 7,959 7,959 
Pseudo-R2  0.34 0.34 0.33 
Wald Chi2 692.11 645.68 610.00 
        Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Another way to think about the importance of a passive IO influence on crisis 
recurrence is to compare my results with a more active IO role (see Boehmer et al. 2004; 
Hansen et al. 2008; Chapman and Wolford 2010; Shannon et al. 2010). One way to 
examine the active role of IOs on crisis recurrence is to consider whether an IO mediated 
in a previous crisis. For the purposes of this comparison, I replaced the shared 
membership variables in my models with a variable that captures mediating activities of 
an IO. This variable refers to the primary mediator of the previous crisis and is coded as 1 
when the mediator of the previous crisis was either an IO or a regional governmental 
organization (0 otherwise). The results show that there is a decrease in crisis recurrence 
when an IO mediated in the previous crisis. The effect, however, is rather small (-0.01 
percentage points) in comparison to the effect of the shared membership (0.3 percentage 
points).  
I have also recoded the categorical control variables to binary variables. I clustered the 
“no violence” and “minor violence” as 0 and “serious clashes” and “full scale war” as 1 
for the violence variable. With regards to the ethnic component variable, I coded 
secessionist and irredentist conflicts as 1, and 0 otherwise (no ethnic conflict). I also 
recoded the variable of the geostrategic salience to one (0) or more subsystems (coded as 
1). After recoding these variables, the results for the main explanatory variables remain 
qualitatively the same (Table 4 in this appendix). The results for the main explanatory 
variables (shared IO memberships, shared peace-brokering IO memberships, and shared 
security IO memberships) remain qualitatively the same. 
Furthermore, I included another robustness test including a variable on bilateral trade 
(Table 5 in this appendix). A log-transformed variable on bilateral trade measures the 
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trade links between dyads in the previous crisis. The information on bilateral trade is 
from the correlates of war project (Barbieri et al. 2016). The results show that bilateral 
trade relations in the previous crisis increase the risk of crisis recurrence, whilst the rest 
of the indicators remain quantitatively the same. Such finding is in line with previous 
research claiming that trade asymmetries may fuel conflict (Garfinkel et al. 2008; Bakaki 
2016). The inclusion of bilateral trade does not affect though the rest of the covariates, 
and the results stay qualitative the same. 
Table 4.  Crisis recurrence and IO memberships 
 
Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Shared IO memberships            -0.01***   
 
(0.00)   
Shared peace-brokering IO 
memberships 
 
-0.07***  
 
 
(0.01)  
Shared security IO memberships 
 
       -0.14*** 
 
 
   (0.03) 
Joint democracy 0.17*          0.10 0.04 
 
(0.09) (0.10)   (0.11) 
Contiguity 0.16***      0.13**     0.14*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04)   (0.04) 
National material capabilities ln -0.00          -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01)          (0.01)    (0.01) 
Violence (binary) -0.01          0.03    0.03 
 
(0.06) (0.05)    (0.05) 
Geostrategic salience (binary) -0.00          -0.00    0.00 
 
(0.06) (0.06)    (0.06) 
Ethnic component (binary) 0.06          0.03 0.04 
 
(0.06) (0.06)    (0.06) 
t -0.35***          -0.35***          -0.35*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02)      (0.02) 
t2 0.02***          0.02***          0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) 
t3 -0.00***          -0.00***          -0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00)      (0.00) 
Constant   - 0.12       -0.22**        -0.23** 
 (0.10) (0.09)    (0.09) 
Obs. 7,959 7,959 7,959 
Pseudo-R2  0.33 0.33 0.33 
Wald Chi2 593.02 534.85 511.85 
        Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5.  Crisis recurrence and IO memberships - bilateral trade 
 
Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
Shared IO memberships            -0.01***   
 
(0.00)   
Shared peace-brokering IO 
memberships 
 
-0.06***  
 
 
(0.02)  
Shared security IO memberships 
 
          -0.09*** 
 
 
 (0.03) 
Joint democracy 0.20**          0.05          -0.01 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Contiguity 0.26***      0.18***      0.18*** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
National material capabilities ln -0.02          -0.02          -0.02 
 (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.01) 
Violence  0.11***          0.12***          0.12*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Geostrategic salience  0.03          -0.02          -0.02 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ethnic component  0.02          0.03          0.03 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Bilateral trade ln 0.11***         0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01)           (0.01) (0.01) 
t -0.40***          -0.40***          -0.40*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
t2 0.02***          0.02***          0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
t3 -0.01***          -0.01***          -0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant   - 0.60       -0.82**       -0.83** 
 (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) 
Obs. 7,211 7,211 7,211 
Pseudo-R2  0.39 0.38 0.38 
Wald Chi2 475.76 443.73 448.39 
        Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
This study has mainly focused on the role of direct links that IOs create for dyads i.e., 
joint membership. Previous studies though have examined the impact of indirect links on 
states’ relationships and behaviour. Dorussen and Ward (2008) argue that via IOs actors 
benefit from third party links that ultimately generate more relations in the international 
system. For this reason, I also examine the impact of third-party links on crisis 
recurrence, as an alternative core explanatory variable (Table 6 in this appendix). Note 
that joint membership in IOs and the measurement of indirect links are highly correlated, 
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hence for a robustness test I replaced the joint membership variable with the indirect links 
variable. The results show that indirect links decrease the likelihood of crisis recurrence 
finding ultimately a similar effect to the one examined in the main analysis on direct links 
(joint membership). 
Table 6.  Crisis recurrence and IO memberships - indirect links 
 
Model 18 
  Indirect links -0.08 
 (0.01) 
Joint democracy 0.09 
 
(0.10) 
Contiguity 0.04 
 
(0.05) 
National material capabilities ln -0.01 
 (0.01) 
Violence  0.06** 
 
(0.02) 
Geostrategic salience  -0.07*** 
 
(0.03) 
Ethnic component  0.01 
 
(0.04) 
t -0.33*** 
 
(0.02) 
t2 0.02*** 
 
(0.00) 
t3 -0.01*** 
 
(0.00) 
Constant   0.42 
 (0.19) 
Obs. 6,461 
Pseudo-R2  0.31 
Wald Chi2 634.36 
 Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
In the main analysis I employ the score of dyads’ joint democracy to control 
for the type of regime and its impact on crisis recurrence. An alternative is to 
control for the democracy score of the weakest links between the dyads i.e., the 
score of the actor with the lower score of democracy. The data is from the Polity 
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IV data (Marshall et al. 2010). The models presented in Table 7 below control 
for the democracy score of the weakest link. The results stay qualitatively the 
same with the democracy variable not being a significant indicator for crisis 
recurrence. Givent that the outcome of interest is international crisis means that it 
only involves minor clashes according to the international crisis behavior (ICB) 
dataset. That is, actors might often get involved in this type of crises regardless 
their form of government. 
Table 7.  Crisis recurrence and IO memberships – weakest link democracy 
 
Model 19 Model 20 Model 20 
Shared IO memberships            -0.01***   
 
(0.00)   
Shared peace-brokering IO 
memberships 
 
-0.07***  
 
 
(0.01)  
Shared security IO memberships 
 
          -0.5*** 
 
 
 (0.03) 
Weakest link democracy -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Contiguity 0.13***      0.10**      0.11*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
National material capabilities ln -0.00          -0.00          -0.00 
 (0.01)          (0.01)          (0.01) 
Violence  0.06**          0.07***          0.07*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Geostrategic salience  -0.05**          -0.05**          -0.05** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ethnic component  0.00          0.02          0.00 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
t -0.35***          -0.36***          -0.36*** 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
t2 0.02***          0.01***          0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
t3 0.01***          -0.01***          -0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant   - 0.12       -0.29**  -0.28* 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 
Obs. 8,418 8,418 8,418 
Pseudo-R2  0.34 0.33 0.33 
Wald Chi2 642.53 564.88 536.42 
        Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Existing literature suggests that conflict management is not a randomly chosen 
phenomenon, and this can create selection bias (Beardsley 2008; Beber 2012; Gartner 
2011). Derived from the specifications presented in Greene (2003, 710) and Maddala 
(1983, 122), I use a bivariate probit model (Table 8) where there are two separate 
equations with correlated disturbances. For these estimations, I define two different 
dependent variables: one for the outcome equation and one for the selection equation. 
The dependent variable for the outcome equation is the recurrence of an international 
crisis. The second equation is relying on crisis recurrence as the outcome variable and is 
then estimated at the same time as the first equation, while taking into consideration the 
correlation in the equations’ error processes (Maddala 1983; Greene 2003). The selection 
variable represents shared membership in IOs (transformed into a binary variable). For 
identifying the model properly, following the strategy of Beber (2012) on an instrumental 
variable, I include time dependence in the selection equation only. This approach then 
captures the rationale that shared membership of IOs might be influenced by previous 
crises; this rationale, though, is unlikely to apply to the outcome stage. The results 
produced in the bivariate probit models are similar to those in the probit model (Model 1 
in Table 3 in the main analysis) and this reassures us of the robustness of the results of 
this analysis.   
As for the estimate of the ρ parameter, the model highlights that a shared membership 
in IOs is likely to be endogenous due to a selection issue in most model specifications. In 
more detail, evidence for selection effects and thus endogeneity are given for all IOs, and 
also when taking peace-brokering IOs, and security IOs as the selection criterion. I do 
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find evidence for a significant selection effect in terms throughout all models (Models 1-
3). This implies that unobserved features that affect the shared membership in IOs also 
influence the risk of crisis recurrence. That said, the core results on the impact of IOs on 
crisis recurrence (outcome equation) are virtually identical to those of the main models 
discussed above (Table 3 in the main analysis).  
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Table 8. Crisis recurrence and IO shared memberships (Bivariate Probit Analysis) 
 
Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
Outcome equation    
IOs -1.54***   
 
(0.18)   
Peace-brokering IOs 
 
-2.35***  
 
 
(0.04)  
Security IOs 
 
 -2.40*** 
 
 
 (0.04) 
Joint democracy -0.32*** -0.21** -0.19* 
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) 
Contiguity 0.13*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
National material capabilities ln 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Violence 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Geostrategic salience -0.10*** -0.12** -0.13*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ethnic component 0.10*** 0.06** 0.04 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant - 0.35 0.42*** 0.49*** 
 (0.22) (0.11) (0.09) 
    
Selection equation    
Joint democracy -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 
 
(0.09) (0.04) (0.03) 
Contiguity 0.36*** 0.24*** 0.31*** 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) 
National material capabilities ln 0.03 0.05*** 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Violence -0.05 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
Geostrategic salience -0.46*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Ethnic component -0.23** 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.10) (0.02) (0.03) 
t 0.37***          0.09***          0.10*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.00) 
t2 -0.04***          -0.01***          -0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
t3 0.00***          0.00***          0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 3.09*** 0.36*** 0.27*** 
 (0.33) (0.09) (0.09) 
ρ 0.69*** 0.09* 0.10* 
 (0.11) (0.05) (0.00) 
Obs. 7,957 7,959 7,959 
   Notes:  Robust standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,  
   *** p < 0.01 
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